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Abstract
Search engine companies collect the “database of in-
tentions”, the histories of their users’ search queries.
These search logs are a gold mine for researchers.
Search engine companies, however, are wary of pub-
lishing search logs in order not to disclose sensitive
information.
In this paper we analyze algorithms for publish-
ing frequent keywords, queries and clicks of a search
log. We first show how methods that achieve vari-
ants of k-anonymity are vulnerable to active attacks.
We then demonstrate that the stronger guarantee en-
sured by ǫ-differential privacy unfortunately does not
provide any utility for this problem. We then pro-
pose an algorithm ZEALOUS and show how to set
its parameters to achieve (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic privacy.
We also contrast our analysis of ZEALOUS with an
analysis by Korolova et al. [17] that achieves (ǫ′, δ′)-
indistinguishability.
Our paper concludes with a large experimen-
tal study using real applications where we com-
pare ZEALOUS and previous work that achieves
k-anonymity in search log publishing. Our results
show that ZEALOUS yields comparable utility to
k−anonymity while at the same time achieving much
stronger privacy guarantees.
1 Introduction
Civilization is the progress toward a society of pri-
vacy. The savage’s whole existence is public, ruled
by the laws of his tribe. Civilization is the process of
setting man free from men. — Ayn Rand.
My favorite thing about the Internet is that you
get to go into the private world of real creeps without
having to smell them. — Penn Jillette.
Search engines play a crucial role in the navigation
through the vastness of the Web. Today’s search en-
gines do not just collect and index webpages, they
also collect and mine information about their users.
They store the queries, clicks, IP-addresses, and other
information about the interactions with users in what
is called a search log. Search logs contain valuable
information that search engines use to tailor their
services better to their users’ needs. They enable
the discovery of trends, patterns, and anomalies in
the search behavior of users, and they can be used
in the development and testing of new algorithms
to improve search performance and quality. Scien-
tists all around the world would like to tap this gold
mine for their own research; search engine companies,
however, do not release them because they contain
sensitive information about their users, for example
searches for diseases, lifestyle choices, personal tastes,
and political affiliations.
The only release of a search log happened in 2006
by AOL, and it went into the annals of tech history
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as one of the great debacles in the search industry.1
AOL published three months of search logs of 650,000
users. The only measure to protect user privacy was
the replacement of user–ids with random numbers
— utterly insufficient protection as the New York
Times showed by identifying a user from Lilburn,
Georgia [4], whose search queries not only contained
identifying information but also sensitive information
about her friends’ ailments.
The AOL search log release shows that simply re-
placing user–ids with random numbers does not pre-
vent information disclosure. Other ad–hoc methods
have been studied and found to be similarly insuffi-
cient, such as the removal of names, age, zip codes
and other identifiers [14] and the replacement of key-
words in search queries by random numbers [18].
In this paper, we compare formal methods of lim-
iting disclosure when publishing frequent keywords,
queries, and clicks of a search log. The methods vary
in the guarantee of disclosure limitations they pro-
vide and in the amount of useful information they re-
tain. We first describe two negative results. We show
that existing proposals to achieve k-anonymity [23] in
search logs [1, 21, 12, 13] are insufficient in the light
of attackers who can actively influence the search
log. We then turn to differential privacy [9], a much
stronger privacy guarantee; however, we show that it
is impossible to achieve good utility with differential
privacy.
We then describe Algorithm ZEALOUS2, devel-
oped independently by Korolova et al. [17] and
us [10] with the goal to achieve relaxations of dif-
ferential privacy. Korolova et al. showed how to
set the parameters of ZEALOUS to guarantee (ǫ, δ)-
indistinguishability [8], and we here offer a new anal-
ysis that shows how to set the parameters of ZEAL-
OUS to guarantee (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential pri-
vacy [20] (Section 4.2), a much stronger privacy guar-
antee as our analytical comparison shows.
Our paper concludes with an extensive experimen-
tal evaluation, where we compare the utility of vari-
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AOL_search_data_scandal
describes the incident, which resulted in the resignation of
AOL’s CTO and an ongoing class action lawsuit against AOL
resulting from the data release.
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ous algorithms that guarantee anonymity or privacy
in search log publishing. Our evaluation includes ap-
plications that use search logs for improving both
search experience and search performance, and our
results show that ZEALOUS’ output is sufficient for
these applications while achieving strong formal pri-
vacy guarantees.
We believe that the results of this research en-
able search engine companies to make their search
log available to researchers without disclosing their
users’ sensitive information: Search engine compa-
nies can apply our algorithm to generate statistics
that are (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differentially private while
retaining good utility for the two applications we
have tested. Beyond publishing search logs we be-
lieve that our findings are of interest when publish-
ing frequent itemsets, as ZEALOUS protects privacy
against much stronger attackers than those consid-
ered in existing work on privacy-preserving publish-
ing of frequent items/itemsets [19].
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. We start with some background in Section 2.
Our negative results are presented in Section 3. We
then describe Algorithm ZEALOUS and its analysis
in Section 4. We compare indistinguishability with
probabilistic differential privacy in Section 5. Section
6 shows the results of an extensive study of how to
set parameters in ZEALOUS, and Section 7 contains
a thorough evaluation of ZEALOUS in comparison
with previous work. We conclude with a discussion
of related work and other applications.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce the problem of publishing
frequent keywords, queries, clicks and other items of
a search log.
2.1 Search Logs
Search engines such as Bing, Google, or Yahoo log
interactions with their users. When a user submits a
query and clicks on one or more results, a new entry
is added to the search log. Without loss of generality,
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we assume that a search log has the following schema:
〈user-id, query, time, clicks〉,
where a user-id identifies a user, a query is a set of
keywords, and clicks is a list of urls that the user
clicked on. The user-id can be determined in various
ways; for example, through cookies, IP addresses or
user accounts. A user history or search history con-
sists of all search entries from a single user. Such a
history is usually partitioned into sessions contain-
ing similar queries; how this partitioning is done is
orthogonal to the techniques in this paper. A query
pair consists of two subsequent queries from the same
user within the same session.
We say that a user history contains a keyword k
if there exists a search log entry such that k is a
keyword in the query of the search log. A keyword
histogram of a search log S records for each keyword
k the number of users ck whose search history in S
contains k. A keyword histogram is thus a set of pairs
(k, ck). We define the query histogram, the query pair
histogram, and the click histogram analogously. We
classify a keyword, query, consecutive query, click in
a histogram to be frequent if its count exceeds some
predefined threshold τ ; when we do not want to spec-
ify whether we count keywords, queries, etc., we also
refer to these objects as items.
With this terminology, we can define our goal as
publishing frequent items (utility) without disclosing
sensitive information about the users (privacy). We
will make both the notion of utility and privacy more
formal in the next sections.
2.2 Disclosure Limitations for Pub-
lishing Search Logs
A simple type of disclosure is the identification of a
particular user’s search history (or parts of the his-
tory) in the published search log. The concept of
k-anonymity has been introduced to avoid such iden-
tifications.
Definition 1 (k-anonymity [23]). A search log is k-
anonymous if the search history of every individual
is indistinguishable from the history of at least k− 1
other individuals in the published search log.
There are several proposals in the literature to
achieve different variants of k-anonymity for search
logs. Adar proposes to partition the search log into
sessions and then to discard queries that are asso-
ciated with fewer than k different user-ids. In each
session the user-id is then replaced by a random num-
ber [1]. We call the output of Adar’s Algorithm a
k-query anonymous search log. Motwani and Nabar
add or delete keywords from sessions until each ses-
sion contains the same keywords as at least k−1 other
sessions in the search log [21], following by a replace-
ment of the user-id by a random number. We call
the output of this algorithm a k-session anonymous
search log. He and Naughton generalize keywords by
taking their prefix until each keyword is part of at
least k search histories and publish a histogram of
the partially generalized keywords [12]. We call the
output a k-keyword anonymous search log. Efficient
ways to anonymize a search log are also discussed by
Yuan et al. [13].
Stronger disclosure limitations try to limit what an
attacker can learn about a user. Differential privacy
guarantees that an attacker learns roughly the same
information about a user whether or not the search
history of that user was included in the search log [9].
Differential privacy has previously been applied to
contingency tables [3], learning problems [5, 16], syn-
thetic data generation [20] and more.
Definition 2 (ǫ-differential privacy [9]). An algo-
rithm A is ǫ-differentially private if for all search logs
S and S′ differing in the search history of a single
user and for all output search logs O:
Pr[A(S) = O] ≤ eǫPr[A(S′) = O].
This definition ensures that the output of the al-
gorithm is insensitive to changing/omitting the com-
plete search history of a single user. We will refer
to search logs that only differ in the search history
of a single user as neighboring search logs. Similar
to the variants of k-anonymity we could also define
variants of differential privacy by looking at neigh-
boring search logs that differ only in the content of
one session, one query or one keyword. However, we
chose to focus on the strongest definition in which an
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attacker learns roughly the same about a user even if
that user’s whole search history was omitted.
Differential privacy is a very strong guarantee and
in some cases it can be too strong to be practically
achievable. We will review two relaxations that have
been proposed in the literature. Machanavajjhala et
al. proposed the following probabilistic version of dif-
ferential privacy.
Definition 3 (probabilistic differential privacy [20]).
An algorithm A satisfies (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differen-
tial privacy if for all search logs S we can divide the
output space Ω into two sets Ω1,Ω2 such that
(1) Pr[A(S) ∈ Ω2] ≤ δ, and
for all neighboring search logs S′ and for all O ∈ Ω1:
(2)e−ǫ Pr[A(S′) = O] ≤ Pr[A(S) = O] ≤ eǫ Pr[A(S′) = O]
This definition guarantees that algorithm A
achieves ǫ-differential privacy with high probabil-
ity (≥ 1 − δ). The set Ω2 contains all outputs
that are considered privacy breaches according to ǫ-
differential privacy; the probability of such an output
is bounded by δ.
The following relaxation has been proposed by
Dwork et al. [8].
Definition 4 (indistinguishability [8]). An algorithm
A is (ǫ, δ)-indistinguishable if for all search logs S, S′
differing in one user history and for all subsets O of
the output space Ω:
Pr[A(S) ∈ O] ≤ eǫ Pr[A(S′) ∈ O] + δ
We will compare these two definitions in Section 5.
In particular, we will show that probabilistic differ-
ential privacy implies indistinguishability, but the
converse does not hold: We show that there ex-
ists an algorithm that is (ǫ′, δ′)-indistinguishable yet
not (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differentially private for any ǫ
and any δ < 1, thus showing that (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic
differential privacy is clearly stronger than (ǫ′, δ′)-
indistinguishability.
2.3 Utility Measures
We will compare the utility of algorithms producing
sanitized search logs both theoretically and experi-
mentally.
2.3.1 Theoretical Utility Measures
For simplicity, suppose we want to publish all items
(such as keywords, queries, etc.) with frequency at
least τ in a search log; we call such items frequent
items ; we call all other items infrequent items. Con-
sider a discrete domain of items D. Each user con-
tributes a set of these items to a search log S. We de-
note by fd(S) the frequency of item d ∈ D in search
log S. We drop the dependency from S when it is
clear from the context.
We define the inaccuracy of a (randomized) algo-
rithm as the expected number of items it gets wrong,
i.e., the number of frequent items that are not in-
cluded in the output, plus the number of infrequent
items that are included in the output. We do not
expect an algorithm to be perfect. It may make mis-
takes for items with frequency very close to τ , and
thus we do not take these items in our notion of ac-
curacy into account. We formalize this “slack” by a
parameter ξ, and given ξ, we introduce the follow-
ing new notions. We call an item d with frequency
fd ≥ τ + ξ a very-frequent item and an item d with
frequency fd ≤ τ − ξ a very-infrequent item. We will
measure the inaccuracy of an algorithm then only us-
ing its inability to retain the very-frequent items and
its inability to filter out the very infrequent items.
Definition 5 ((A, S)-inaccuracy). Given an algo-
rithm A and an input search log S, the (A, S)-
inaccuracy with slack ξ is defined as
E[|{d ∈ A(S)|fd(S) < τ − ξ}∪
{d 6∈ A(S)|fd(S) > τ + ξ}|]
The expectation is taken over the randomness of
the algorithm. As an example, consider the simple
algorithm that always outputs the empty set; we call
this algorithm the baseline algorithm. On input S
the Baseline Algorithm has an inaccuracy equal to
the number of items with frequency at least τ + ξ.
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For the results in the next sections it will be useful
to distinguish the error of an algorithm on the very-
frequent items and its error on the very-infrequent
items. We can rewrite the inaccuracy as:∑
d:fd(S)>τ+ξ
1− Pr[d ∈ A(S)] +
∑
d∈D:fd(S)<τ−ξ
Pr[d ∈ A(S)]
Thus, the (A, S)-inaccuracy with slack ξ can be
rewritten as the inability to retain the very-frequent
items plus the inability to filter out the very-
infrequent items. For example, the baseline algo-
rithm has an inaccuracy to filter of 0 inaccuracy to
retain equal to the number of very-frequent items.
Definition 6 (c–accuracy). An algorithm A is c–
accurate if for any input search log S and any very-
frequent item d in S, the probability that A outputs
d is at least c.
2.3.2 Experimental Utility Measures
Traditionally, the utility of a privacy-preserving algo-
rithm has been evaluated by comparing some statis-
tics of the input with the output to see “how much
information is lost.” The choice of suitable statistics
is a difficult problem as these statistics need to mirror
the sufficient statistics of applications that will use
the sanitized search log, and for some applications
the sufficient statistics are hard to characterize. To
avoid this drawback, Brickell et al. [6] measure the
utility with respect to data mining tasks and they
take the actual classification error of an induced clas-
sifier as their utility metric.
In this paper we take a similar approach. We use
two real applications from the information retrieval
community: Index caching, as a representative ap-
plication for search performance, and query substitu-
tion, as a representative application for search qual-
ity. For both application the sufficient statistics are
histograms of keywords, queries, or query pairs.
Index Caching. Search engines maintain an in-
verted index which, in its simplest instantiation, con-
tains for each keyword a posting list of identifiers of
the documents in which the keyword appears. This
index can be used to answer search queries, but also
to classify queries for choosing sponsored search re-
sults. The index is usually too large to fit in memory,
but maintaining a part of it in memory reduces re-
sponse time for all these applications. We use the for-
mulation of the index caching problem from Baeza–
Yates [2]. We are given a keyword search workload, a
distribution over keywords indicating the likelihood
of a keyword appearing in a search query. It is our
goal to cache in memory a set of posting lists that for
a given workload maximizes the cache-hit-probability
while not exceeding the storage capacity. Here the
hit-probability is the probability that the posting list
of a keyword can be found in memory given the key-
word search workload.
Query Substitution. Query substitutions are sug-
gestions to rephrase a user query to match it to doc-
uments or advertisements that do not contain the ac-
tual keywords of the query. Query substitutions can
be applied in query refinement, sponsored search, and
spelling error correction [15]. Algorithms for query
substitution examine query pairs to learn how users
re-phrase queries. We use an algorithm developed by
Jones et al. [15].
3 Negative Results
In this section, we discuss the deficiency of two ex-
isting models of disclosure limitations for search log
publication. Section 3.1 focuses on k-anonymity, and
Section 3.2 investigates differential privacy.
3.1 Insufficiency of Anonymity
k-anonymity and its variants prevent an attacker
from uniquely identifying the user that corresponds
to a search history in the sanitized search log. While
it offers great utility even beyond releasing frequent
items its disclosure guarantee might not be satisfac-
tory. Even without unique identification of a user,
an attacker can infer the keywords or queries used by
the user. k-anonymity does not protect against this
severe information disclosure.
There is another issue largely overlooked
with the current implementations of anonymity.
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That is instead of guaranteeing that the key-
words/queries/sessions of k individuals are indistin-
guishable in a search log they only assure that the
keywords/queries/sessions associated with k different
user-IDs are indistinguishable. These two guarantees
are not the same since individuals can have multiple
accounts or share accounts. An attacker can exploit
this by creating multiple accounts and submitting
the same fake queries from these accounts. It
can happen that in a k-keyword/query/session-
anonymous search log the keywords/queries/sessions
of a user are only indistinguishable from k − 1 fake
keywords/queries/sessions submitted by an attacker.
It is doubtful that this type of indistinguishability
at the level of user-IDs is satisfactory.
3.2 Impossibility of Differential Pri-
vacy
In the following, we illustrate the infeasibility of dif-
ferential privacy in search log publication. In partic-
ular, we show that, under realistic settings, no dif-
ferentially private algorithm can produce a sanitized
search log with reasonable utility (utility is measured
as defined in Section 2.3.1 using our notion of accu-
racy). Our analysis is based on the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For a set of U users, let S and S′ be
two search logs each containing at most m items
from some domain D per user. Let A be an ǫ-
differentially private algorithm that, given S, re-
tains a very-frequent item d in S with probability p.
Then, given S′, A retains d with probability at least
p/(eL1(S,S
′)·ǫ/m), where L1(S, S
′) =
∑
d∈D |fd(S) −
fd(S
′)| denotes the L1 distance between S and S
′.
Lemma 1 follows directly from the definition of
ǫ-differential privacy. Based on Lemma 1, we have
the following theorem, which shows that any ǫ-
differentially private algorithm that is accurate for
very-frequent items must be inaccurate for very-
infrequent items. The rationale is that, if given a
search log S, an algorithm outputs one very-frequent
item d in S, then even if the input to the algorithm is
a search log where d is very-infrequent, the algorithm
should still output d with a certain probability; oth-
erwise, the algorithm cannot be differentially private.
Theorem 1. Consider an accuracy constant c, a
threshold τ , a slack ξ and a very large domain D of
size ≥ Um
(
2e2ǫ(τ+ξ)/m
c(τ+ξ) +
1
τ−ξ+1
)
, where m denotes
the maximum number of items that a user may have
in a search log. Let A be an ǫ-differentially private
algorithm that is c-accurate (according to Definition
6) for the very-frequent items. Then, for any input
search log, the inaccuracy of A is greater than the
inaccuracy of an algorithm that always outputs an
empty set.
Proof. Consider an ǫ-differentially private algorithm
A′ that is c-accurate for the very-frequent items. Fix
some input S. We are going to show that for each
very-infrequent item d in S the probability of out-
putting d is at least c/(eǫ(τ+ξ)/m). For each item
d ∈ D construct S′d from S by changing τ + ξ of the
items to d. That way d is very-frequent (with fre-
quency at least τ + ξ) and L1(S, S
′
d) ≤ 2(τ + ξ). By
Definition 6, we have that
Pr[d ∈ A′(S′d)] ≥ c.
By Lemma 1 it follows that the probability of out-
putting d is at least c/(e2ǫ(τ+ξ)/m) for any input
database. This means that we can compute a
lower bound on the inability to filter out the very-
infrequent items in S by summing up this probability
over all possible values d ∈ D that are very-infrequent
in S. Note, that there are at least D − Umτ−ξ+1 many
very-infrequent items in S. Therefore, the inabil-
ity to filter out the very-infrequent items is at least(
|D| − Umτ−ξ+1
)
c/(e2ǫ(τ+ξ)/m). For large domains of
size at least Um
(
2e2ǫ(τ+ξ)/m
c(τ+ξ) +
1
τ−ξ+1
)
the inaccu-
racy is at least 2Umτ+ξ which is greater than the in-
accuracy of the baseline.
To illustrate Theorem 1, let us consider a search
log S where each query contains at most 3 keywords
selected from a limited vocabulary of 900,000 words.
Let D be the domain of the consecutive query pairs in
S. We have |D| = 5.3× 1035. Consider the following
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setting of the parameters τ + ξ = 50,m = 10, U =
1,000,000, ǫ = 1, that is typical practice. By The-
orem 1, if an ǫ-differentially private algorithm A is
0.01-accurate for very-frequent query pairs, then, in
terms of overall inaccuracy (for both very-frequent
and very-infrequent query pairs), A must be infe-
rior to an algorithm that always outputs an empty
set. In other words, no differentially private algo-
rithm can be accurate for both very-frequent and
very-infrequent query pairs.
4 Achieving Privacy
In this section, we introduce a search log publishing
algorithm called ZEALOUS that has been indepen-
dently developed by Korolova et al. [17] and us [10].
ZEALOUS ensures probabilistic differential privacy,
and it follows a simple two-phase framework. In the
first phase, ZEALOUS generates a histogram of items
in the input search log, and then removes from the
histogram the items with frequencies below a thresh-
old. In the second phase, ZEALOUS adds noise to
the histogram counts, and eliminates the items whose
noisy frequencies are smaller than another threshold.
The resulting histogram (referred to as the sanitized
histogram) is then returned as the output. Figure 1
depicts the steps of ZEALOUS.
Algorithm ZEALOUS for Publishing Frequent
Items of a Search Log
Input: Search log S, positive numbers m, λ, τ , τ ′
1. For each user u select a set su of up tom distinct
items from u’s search history in S.3
2. Based on the selected items, create a histogram
consisting of pairs (k, ck), where k denotes an
item and ck denotes the number of users u that
have k in their search history su. We call this
histogram the original histogram.
3. Delete from the histogram the pairs (k, ck) with
count ck smaller than τ .
3These items can be selected in various ways as long as the
selection criteria is not based on the data. Random selection
is one candidate.
4. For each pair (k, ck) in the histogram, sample a
random number ηk from the Laplace distribution
Lap(λ)4, and add ηk to the count ck, resulting
in a noisy count: c˜k ← ck + ηk.
5. Delete from the histogram the pairs (k, c˜k) with
noisy counts c˜k ≤ τ
′.
6. Publish the remaining items and their noisy
counts.
To understand the purpose of the various steps one
has to keep in mind the privacy guarantee we would
like to achieve. Step 1., 2. and 4. of the algorithm
are fairly standard. It is known that adding Lapla-
cian noise to histogram counts achieves ǫ-differential
privacy [9]. However, the previous section explained
that these steps alone result in poor utility because
for large domains many infrequent items will have
high noisy counts. To deal better with large domains
we restrict the histogram to items with counts at least
τ in Step 2. This restriction leaks information and
thus the output after Step 4. is not ǫ-differentially
private. One can show that it is not even (ǫ, δ)–
probabilistic differentially private (for δ < 1/2). Step
5. disguises the information leaked in Step 3. in order
to achieve probabilistic differential privacy.
In what follows, we will investigate the theoreti-
cal performance of ZEALOUS in terms of both pri-
vacy and utility. Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 discuss
the privacy guarantees of ZEALOUS with respect to
(ǫ, δ)-indistinguishability and (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic dif-
ferential privacy, respectively. Section 4.3 presents
a quantitative analysis of the privacy protection of-
fered by ZEALOUS. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 analyze the
utility guarantees of ZEALOUS.
4.1 Indistinguishability Analysis
Theorem 2 states how the parameters of ZEALOUS
can be set to obtain a sanitized histogram that pro-
vides (ǫ′, δ′)-indistinguishability.
4The Laplace distribution with scale parameter λ has the
probability density function 1
2λ
e
−
|x|
λ .
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free honda certifiedcar
...
filter
filter ≥ τ
add noise λ
filter > τ ′
per user
τ
free hondacar
...
τ ′
free honda certifiedcar
...
≤ m keywords
Histogram ~s
Histogram
Histogram
Histogram
Searchlog SL
〈Bob 73, “honda accord”, ... 〉
〈Bob 73, “certified car”, ... 〉
〈CarlRu, “free mp3”, ... 〉
free hondacar
Figure 1: Privacy–Preserving Algorithm.
Theorem 2. [17] Given a search log S and positive
numbers m, τ , τ ′, and λ, ZEALOUS achieves (ǫ′, δ′)-
indistinguishability, if
λ ≥ 2m/ǫ′, and (1)
τ = 1, and (2)
τ ′ ≥ m
(
1−
log(2δ
′
m )
ǫ′
)
. (3)
To publish not only frequent queries but also their
clicks, Korolova et al. [17] suggest to first deter-
mine the frequent queries and then publish noisy
counts of the clicks to their top-100 ranked docu-
ments. In particular, if we use ZEALOUS to publish
frequent queries in a manner that achieves (ǫ′, δ′)-
indistinguishability, we can also publish the noisy
click distributions of the top-100 ranked documents
for each of the frequent queries, by simply adding
Laplacian noise to the click counts with scale 2m/ǫ′.
Together the sanitized query and click histogram
achieves (2ǫ′, δ′)-indistinguishability.
Privacy Guarantee τ ′ = 100 τ ′ = 200
λ = 1 (ǫ, ǫ′ = 10) δ = 1.3× 10−37 δ = 4.7× 10−81
δ′ = 1.4× 10−41 δ′ = 5.2× 10−85
λ = 5 (ǫ, ǫ′ = 2) δ = 3.2× 10−3 δ = 6.5× 10−12
δ′ = 1.4× 10−8 δ′ = 2.9× 10−17
Table 1: (ǫ′, δ′)-indistinguishability vs. (ǫ, δ)-
probabilistic differential privacy. U = 500k, m = 5.
4.2 Probabilistic Differential Privacy
Analysis
Given values for ǫ, δ, τ and m, the following theorem
tells us how to set the parameters λ and τ ′ to ensure
that ZEALOUS achieves (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differen-
tial privacy.
Theorem 3. Given a search log S and positive num-
bers m, τ , τ ′, and λ, ZEALOUS achieves (ǫ, δ)-
probabilistic differential privacy, if
λ ≥ 2m/ǫ, and (4)
τ ′−τ ≥ max
(
−λ ln
(
2− 2e−
1
λ
)
,−λ ln
(
2δ
U ·m/τ
))
,
(5)
where U denotes the number of users in S.
The proof of Theorem 3 can be found in Ap-
pendix A.1.
4.3 Quantitative Comparison of Prob.
Diff. Privacy and Indistinguisha-
bility for ZEALOUS
In Table 1, we illustrate the levels of (ǫ′, δ′)-
indistinguishability and (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differen-
tial privacy achieved by ZEALOUS for various noise
and threshold parameters. We fix the number of users
to U = 500k, and the maximum number of items
from a user to m = 5, which is a typical setting that
will be explored in our experiments. Table 1 shows
the tradeoff between utility and privacy: A larger λ
results in a greater amount of noise in the sanitized
search log (i.e., decreased data utility), but it also
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leads to smaller ǫ and ǫ′ (i.e., stronger privacy guar-
antee). Similarly, when τ ′ increases, the sanitized
search log provides less utility (since fewer items are
published) but a higher level of privacy protection (as
δ and δ′ decreases).
Interestingly, given λ and τ ′, we always have δ >
δ′. This is due to the fact that (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic
differential privacy is a stronger privacy guarantee
than (ǫ′, δ′)-indistinguishability, as will be discussed
in Section 5.
4.4 Utility Analysis
Next, we analyze the utility guarantee of ZEALOUS
in terms of its accuracy (as defined in Section 2.3.1).
Theorem 4. Given parameters τ = τ∗−ξ, τ ′ = τ∗+
ξ, noise scale λ, and a search log S, the inaccuracy of
ZEALOUS with slack ξ equals∑
d:fd(S)>τ+ξ
1/2e−2ξ/λ +
∑
d∈D:fd(S)<τ−ξ
0
In particular, this means that ZEALOUS is (1 −
1/2e−
ξ
λ )-accurate for the very-frequent items (of fre-
quency ≥ τ∗+ ξ) and it provides perfect accuracy for
the very-infrequent items (of frequency < τ∗ − ξ).
Proof. It is easy to see that ZEALOUS provides per-
fect accuracy of filtering out infrequent items. More-
over, the probability of outputting a very-frequent
item is at least
1− 1/2e−
ξ
λ
which is the probability that the Lap(λ)-distributed
noise that is added to the count is at least−ξ so that a
very-frequent item with count at least τ + ξ remains
in the output of the algorithm. This probability is
at least 1/2. All in all it has higher accuracy than
the baseline algorithm on all inputs with at least one
very-frequent item.
4.5 Separation Result
Combining the analysis in Sections 3.2 and 4.4, we
obtain the following separation result between ǫ-
differential privacy and (ǫ, δ)- probabilistic differen-
tial privacy.
Theorem 5 (Separation Result). Our (ǫ, δ)- prob-
abilistic differentially private algorithm ZEALOUS
is able to retain frequent items with probability at
least 1/2 while filtering out all infrequent items. On
the other hand, for any ǫ-differentially private algo-
rithm that can retain frequent items with non-zero
probability (independent of the input database), its
inaccuracy for large item domains is larger than an
algorithm that always outputs an empty set.
5 Comparing Indistinguishabil-
ity with Probabilistic Differ-
ential Privacy
In this section we study the relationship between
(ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy and (ǫ′, δ′)-
indistinguishability. First we will prove that prob-
abilistic differential privacy implies indistinguisha-
bility. Then we will show that the converse is
not true. We show that there exists an algorithm
that is (ǫ′, δ′)-indistinguishable yet blatantly non-ǫ-
differentially private (and also not (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic
differentially private for any value of ǫ and δ < 1).
This fact might convince a data publisher to strongly
prefer an algorithm that achieves (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic
differential privacy over one that is only known to
achieve (ǫ′, δ′)-indistinguishability. It also might con-
vince researchers to analyze the probabilistic privacy
guarantee of algorithms that are only known to be
indistinguishable as in [8] or [22].
First we show that our definition implies (ǫ, δ)-
indistinguishability.
Proposition 1. If an algorithm A is (ǫ, δ)-
probabilistic differentially private then it is also (ǫ, δ)-
indistinguishable.
The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Ap-
pendix A.2. The converse of Proposition 1 does not
hold. In particular, there exists an an algorithm that
is (ǫ′, δ′)-indistinguishable but not (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic
differentially private for any choice of ǫ and δ < 1, as
illustrated in the following example.
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Example 1. Consider the following algorithm that
takes as input a search log S with search histories of
U users.
Algorithm Aˆ
Input: Search log S ∈ DU
1. Sample uniformly at random a single search his-
tory from the set of all histories excluding the
first user’s search history.
2. Return this search history.
The following proposition analyzes the privacy of
Algorithm Aˆ.
Proposition 2. For any finite domain of search
histories D Algorithm Aˆ is (ǫ′, 1/(|D| − 1))-
indistinguishable for all ǫ′ > 0 on inputs from DU .
The proof can be found in Appendix A.3. The next
proposition shows that every single output of the al-
gorithm constitutes a privacy breach.
Proposition 3. For any search log S, the output of
Algorithm Aˆ constitutes a privacy breach according
to ǫ-differentially privacy for any value of ǫ.
Proof. Fix an input S and an output O that is differ-
ent from the search history of the first user. Consider
the input S′ differing from S only in the first user his-
tory, where S′1 = O. Here,
1/(|D| − 1) = Pr[A(S) = O] 6≤ eǫ Pr[A(S′) = O] = 0.
Thus the output S breaches the privacy of the first
user according to ǫ-differentially privacy.
Corollary 1. Algorithm Aˆ is (ǫ′, 1/(|D| − 1))-
indistinguishable for all ǫ′ > 0. But it is not (ǫ, δ)-
probabilistic differentially private for any ǫ and any
δ < 1.
By Corollary 1, an algorithm that is (ǫ′, δ′)-
indistinguishable may not achieve any form of (ǫ, δ)-
probabilistic differential privacy, even if δ′ is set to an
extremely small value of 1/(|D| − 1). This illustrates
the significant gap between (ǫ′, δ′)-indistinguishable
and (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy.
τ 1 3 4 5 7 9
τ ′ 81.1 78.7 78.6 78.7 79.3 80.3
Table 2: τ ′ as a function of τ for m = 2, ǫ = 1,
δ = 0.01
6 Choosing Parameters
Apart from the privacy parameters ǫ and δ, ZEAL-
OUS requires the data publisher to specify two more
parameters: τ , the first threshold used to eliminate
keywords with low counts (Step 3), and m, the num-
ber of contributions per user. These parameters af-
fect both the noise added to each count as well as the
second threshold τ ′. Before we discuss the choice of
these parameters we explain the general setup of our
experiments.
Data. In our experiments we work with a search log
of user queries from a major search engine collected
from 500,000 users over a period of one month. This
search log contains about one million distinct key-
words, three million distinct queries, three million
distinct query pairs, and 4.5 million distinct clicks.
Privacy Parameters. In all experiments we set
δ = 0.001. Thus the probability that the output
of ZEALOUS could breach the privacy of any user
is very small. We explore different levels of (ǫ, δ)-
probabilistic differential privacy by varying ǫ.
6.1 Choosing Threshold τ
We would like to retain as much information as possi-
ble in the published search log. A smaller value for τ ′
immediately leads to a histogram with higher utility
because fewer items and their noisy counts are filtered
out in the last step of ZEALOUS. Thus if we choose
τ in a way that minimizes τ ′ we maximize the util-
ity of the resulting histogram. Interestingly, choosing
τ = 1 does not necessarily minimize the value of τ ′.
Table 2 presents the value of τ ′ for different values of
τ for m = 2 and ǫ = 1. Table 2 shows that for our
parameter settings τ ′ is minimized when τ = 4. We
can show the following optimality result which tells
us how to choose τ optimally in order to maximize
utility.
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Figure 2: Preservation of the counts of the top-j most frequent items by ZEALOUS under varying m. The
domain of items are keywords, queries, clicks, and query pairs. Preservation is measured as the average
L1-distance and KL-divergence of the released counts and their true counts and the number and fraction of
unpublished top-j most frequent items are shown.
Proposition 4. For a fixed ǫ, δ and m choosing τ =
⌈2m/ǫ⌉ minimizes the value of τ ′.
The proof follows from taking the derivative of τ ′ as
a function of τ (based on Equation (5)) to determine
its minimum.
6.2 Choosing the Number of Contri-
butions m
Proposition 4 tells us how to set τ in order to maxi-
mize utility. Next we will discuss how to set m opti-
mally. We will do so by studying the effect of vary-
ing m on the coverage and the precision of the top-j
most frequent items in the sanitized histogram. The
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Figure 3: Same as Figure 2 except that the x-axis is now varying j for top-j and not m for the number of
contributions.
top-j coverage of a sanitized search log is defined as
the fraction of distinct items among the top-j most
frequent items in the original search log that also ap-
pear in the sanitized search log. The top-j precision
of a sanitized search log is defined as the distance be-
tween the relative frequencies in the original search
log versus the sanitized search log for the top-j most
frequent items. In particular, we study two distance
metrics between the relative frequencies: the average
L-1 distance and the KL-divergence.
As a first study of coverage, Table 3 shows the num-
ber of distinct items (recall that items can be key-
words, queries, query pairs, or clicks) in the sanitized
search log as m increases. We observe that coverage
decreases as we increase m. Moreover, the decrease
in the number of published items is more dramatic
for larger domains than for smaller domains. The
number of distinct keywords decreases by 55% while
at the same time the number of distinct query pairs
decreases by 96% as we increase m from 1 to 40.
This trend has two reasons. First, from Theorem 3
and Proposition 4 we see that threshold τ ′ increases
super-linearly in m. Second, as m increases the num-
ber of keywords contributed by the users increases
only sub-linearly in m; fewer users are able to sup-
ply m items for increasing values of m. Hence, fewer
items pass the threshold τ ′ as m increases. The re-
duction is larger for query pairs than for keywords,
because the average number of query pairs per user
is smaller than the average number of keywords per
user in the original search log (shown in Table 4).
To understand how m affects precision, we mea-
sure the total sum of the counts in the sanitized his-
togram as we increase m in Table 3. Higher total
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(A) Number of distinct items released under
ZEALOUS.
m 1 4 8 20 40
keywords 6667 6043 5372 4062 2964
queries 3334 2087 1440 751 408
clicks 2813 1576 1001 486 246
query pairs 331 169 100 40 13
(B) Number of total items ×103 released under
ZEALOUS.
m 1 4 8 20 40
keywords 329 1157 1894 3106 3871
queries 147 314 402 464 439
clicks 118 234 286 317 290
query pairs 8 14 15 12 7
Table 3:
keywords queries clicks query pairs
56 20 14 7
Table 4: Avg number of items per user in the original
search log
counts offer the possibility to match the original dis-
tribution at a finer granularity. We observe that as
we increase m, the total counts increase until a tip-
ping point is reached after which they start decreas-
ing again. This effect is as expected for the following
reason: As m increases, each user contributes more
items, which leads to higher counts in the sanitized
histogram. However, the total count increases only
sub-linearly with m (and even decreases) due to the
reduction in coverage we discussed above. We found
that the tipping point where the total count starts
to decrease corresponds approximately to the aver-
age number of items contributed by each user in the
original search log (shown in Table 4). This suggests
that we should choose m to be smaller than the aver-
age number of items, because it offers better coverage,
higher total counts, and reduces the noise compared
to higher values of m.
Let us take a closer look at the precision and cov-
erage of the histograms of the various domains in
Figures 2 and 3. In Figure 2 we vary m between
1 and 40. Each curve plots the precision or coverage
of the sanitized search log at various values of the
top-j parameter in comparison to the original search
log. We vary the top-j parameter but never choose
it higher than the number of distinct items in the
original search log for the various domains. The first
two rows plot precision curves for the average L-1 dis-
tance (first row) and the KL-divergence (second row)
of the relative frequencies. The lower two rows plot
the coverage curves, i.e., the total number of top-j
items (third row) and the relative number of top-j
items (fourth row) in the original search log that do
not appear in sanitized search log. First, observe
that the coverage decreases as m increases, which
confirms our discussion about the number of distinct
items. Moreover, we see that the coverage gets worse
for increasing values of the top-j parameter. This il-
lustrates that ZEALOUS gives better utility for the
more frequent items. Second, note that for small val-
ues of the top-j parameter, values of m > 1 give bet-
ter precision. However, when the top-j parameter is
increased, m = 1 gives better precision because the
precision of the top-j values degrades due to items
no longer appearing in the sanitized search log due
to the increased cutoffs.
Figure 3 shows the same statistics varying the top-j
parameter on the x-axis. Each curve plots the preci-
sion for m = 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 40, respectively. Note that
m = 1 does not always give the best precision; for
keywords, m = 8 has the lowest KL-divergence, and
for queries, m = 2 has the lowest KL-divergence. As
we can see from these results, there are two “regimes”
for setting the value ofm. If we are mainly interested
in coverage, thenm should be set to 1. However, if we
are only interested in a few top-j items then we can
increase precision by choosing a larger value for m;
and in this case we recommend the average number
of items per user.
We will see this dichotomy again in our real ap-
plications of search log analysis: The index caching
application does not require high coverage because
of its storage restriction. However, high precision of
the top-j most frequent items is necessary to deter-
mine which of them to keep in memory. On the other
hand, in order to generate many query substitutions,
a larger number of distinct queries and query pairs is
required. Thus m should be set to a large value for
13
index caching and to a small value for query substi-
tution.
7 Application-Oriented Evalu-
ation
In this section we show the results of an application-
oriented evaluation of privacy-preserving search logs
generated by ZEALOUS in comparison to a k-
anonymous search log and the original search log as
points of comparison. Note that our utility eval-
uation does not determine the “better” algorithm
since when choosing an algorithm in practice one
has to consider both the utility and disclosure lim-
itation guarantees of an algorithm. Our results show
the “price” that we have to pay (in terms of de-
creased utility) when we give the stronger guaran-
tees of (probabilistic versions of) differential privacy
as opposed to k-anonymity.
Algorithms.
We experimentally compare the utility of ZEAL-
OUS against a representative k-anonymity algorithm
by Adar for publishing search logs [1]. Recall
that Adar’s Algorithm creates a k-query anonymous
search log as follows: First all queries that are posed
by fewer than k distinct users are eliminated. Then
histograms of keywords, queries, and query pairs
from the k-query anonymous search log are com-
puted. ZEALOUS can be used to achieve (ǫ′, δ′)-
indistinguishability as well as (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic dif-
ferential privacy. For the ease of presentation we only
show results with probabilistic differential privacy;
using Theorems 2 and 3 it is straightforward to com-
pute the corresponding indistinguishability guaran-
tee. For brevity, we refer to the (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic
differentially private algorithm as ǫ–Differential in
the figures.
Evaluation Metrics.
We evaluate the performance of the algorithms in
two ways. First, we measure how well the output
of the algorithms preserves selected statistics of the
original search log. Second, we pick two real appli-
cations from the information retrieval community to
evaluate the utility of ZEALOUS: Index caching as
a representative application for search performance,
and query substitution as a representative application
for search quality. Evaluating the output of ZEAL-
OUS with these two applications will help us to fully
understand the performance of ZEALOUS in an ap-
plication context. We first describe our utility evalu-
ation with statistics in Section 7.1 and then our eval-
uation with real applications in Sections 7.2 and 7.3.
7.1 General Statistics
We explore different statistics that measure the differ-
ence of sanitized histograms to the histograms com-
puted using the original search log. We analyze the
histograms of keywords, queries, and query pairs for
both sanitization methods. For clicks we only con-
sider ZEALOUS histograms since a k-query anony-
mous search log is not designed to publish click data.
In our first experiment we compare the distribution
of the counts in the histograms. Note that a k-query
anonymous search log will never have query and key-
word counts below k, and similarly a ZEALOUS his-
togram will never have counts below τ ′. We choose
ǫ = 5,m = 1 for which threshold τ ′ ≈ 10. Therefore
we deliberately set k = 10 such that k ≈ τ ′.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the counts in
the histograms on a log-log scale. Recall that the
k-query anonymous search log does not contain any
click data, and thus it does not appear in Figure 4(c).
We see that the power-law shape of the distribution
is well preserved. However, the total frequencies are
lower for the sanitized search logs than the frequen-
cies in the original histogram because the algorithms
filter out a large number of items. We also see the
cutoffs created by k and τ ′. We observe that as the
domain increases from keywords to clicks and query
pairs, the number of items that are not frequent in the
original search log increases. For example, the num-
ber of clicks with count equal to one is an order of
magnitude larger than the number of keywords with
count equal to one.
While the shape of the count distribution is well
preserved, we would also like to know whether the
counts of frequent keywords, queries, query pairs, and
clicks are also preserved and what impact the privacy
parameters ǫ and the anonymity parameter k have.
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Figure 4: Distributions of counts in the histograms over keywords, queries, clicks, and query pairs in the
original search log and its sanitized versions created by 10-anonymity and 5-probabilistic differential privacy
(with m = 1).
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Figure 5: Average difference between counts of items in the original histogram and the ǫ-probabilistic
differential privacy-preserving histogram, and the k-anonymous histogram for varying parameters ǫ (with
m = 1) and k.
Figure 5 shows the average differences to the counts
in the original histogram. We scaled up the counts
in sanitized histograms by a common factor so that
the total counts were equal to the total counts of the
original histogram, then we calculated the average
difference between the counts. The average is taken
over all keywords that have non-zero count in the
original search log. As such this metric takes both
coverage and precision into account.
As expected, with increasing ǫ the average differ-
ence decreases, since the noise added to each count
decreases. Similarly, by decreasing k the accuracy in-
creases because more queries will pass the threshold.
Figure 5 shows that the average difference is compa-
rable for the k–anonymous histogram and the output
of ZEALOUS. Note that the output of ZEALOUS
for keywords is more accurate than a k-anonymous
histogram for all values of ǫ > 2. For queries we ob-
tain roughly the same average difference for k = 60
and ǫ = 6. For query pairs the k-query anonymous
histogram provides better utility.
We also computed other metrics such as the root-
mean-square value of the differences and the total
variation difference; they all reveal similar qualita-
tive trends. Despite the fact that ZEALOUS disre-
gards many search log records (by throwing out all
but m contributions per user and by throwing out
low frequent counts), ZEALOUS is able to preserve
the overall distribution well.
7.2 Index Caching
In the index caching problem, we aim to cache in-
memory a set of posting lists that maximizes the hit-
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Figure 6: Hit probabilities of the inverted index con-
struction based on the original search log, the k-
anonymous search log, and the ZEALOUS histogram
under varying parameters k and ǫ (and contributions
m in (b)).
probability over all keywords (see Section2.3.2). In
our experiments, we use an improved version of the
algorithm developed by Baeza–Yates to decide which
posting lists should be kept in memory [2]. Our algo-
rithm first assigns each keyword a score, which equals
its frequency in the search log divided by the number
of documents that contain the keyword. Keywords
are chosen using a greedy bin-packing strategy where
we sequentially add posting lists from the keywords
with the highest score until the memory is filled. In
our experiments we fixed the memory size to be 1
GB, and each document posting to be 8 Bytes (other
parameters give comparable results). Our inverted
index stores the document posting list for each key-
word sorted according to their relevance which allows
to retrieve the documents in the order of their rele-
vance. We truncate this list in memory to contain
at most 200,000 documents. Hence, for an incom-
ing query the search engine retrieves the posting list
for each keyword in the query either from memory
or from disk. If the intersection of the posting lists
happens to be empty, then less relevant documents
are retrieved from disk for those keywords for which
only the truncated posting list is kept on memory.
Figure 6(a) shows the hit–probabilities of the in-
verted index constructed using the original search
log, the k-anonymous search log, and the ZEAL-
OUS histogram (for m = 6) with our greedy approx-
imation algorithm. We observe that our ZEALOUS
histogram achieves better utility than the k-query
anonymous search log for a range of parameters. We
note that the utility suffers only marginally when
increasing the privacy parameter or the anonymity
parameter (at least in the range that we have con-
sidered). This can be explained by the fact that it
requires only a few very frequent keywords to achieve
a high hit–probability. Keywords with a big positive
impact on the hit-probability are less likely to be fil-
tered out by ZEALOUS than keywords with a small
positive impact. This explains the marginal decrease
in utility for increased privacy.
As a last experiment we study the effect of vary-
ing m on the hit-probability in Figure 6(b). We ob-
serve that the hit probability for m = 6 is above 0.36
whereas the hit probability for m = 1 is less than
0.33. As discussed a higher value for m increases the
accuracy, but reduces the coverage. Index caching
really requires roughly the top 85 most frequent key-
words that are still covered when setting m = 6.
We also experimented with higher values of m and
observed that the hit-probability decreases at some
point.
7.3 Query Substitution
Algorithms for query substitution examine query
pairs to learn how users re-phrase queries. We use an
algorithm developed by Jones et al. in which related
queries for a query are identified in two steps [15].
First, the query is partitioned into subsets of key-
words, called phrases, based on their mutual infor-
mation. Next, for each phrase, candidate query sub-
stitutions are determined based on the distribution
of queries.
We run this algorithm to generate ranked substi-
tution on the sanitized search logs. We then com-
pare these rankings with the rankings produced by
the original search log which serve as ground truth.
To measure the quality of the query substitutions,
we compute the precision/recall, MAP (mean average
precision) and NDG (normalized discounted cumula-
tive gain) of the top-j suggestions for each query; let
us define these metrics next.
Consider a query q and its list of top-j ranked sub-
stitutions q′0, . . . , q
′
j−1 computed based on a sanitized
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search log. We compare this ranking against the top-
j ranked substitutions q0, . . . , qj−1 computed based
on the original search log as follows. The precision
of a query q is the fraction of substitutions from the
sanitized search log that are also contained in our
ground truth ranking:
Precision(q) =
|{q0, . . . , qj−1} ∩ {q
′
0, . . . , q
′
j−1}|
|{q′0, . . . , q
′
j−1}|
Note, that the number of items in the ranking for a
query q can be less than j. The recall of a query q is
the fraction of substitutions in our ground truth that
are contained in the substitutions from the sanitized
search log:
Recall(q) =
|{q0, . . . , qj−1} ∩ {q
′
0, . . . , q
′
j−1}|
|{q0, . . . , qj−1}|
MAP measures the precision of the ranked items for
a query as the ratio of true rank and assigned rank:
MAP(q) =
j−1∑
i=0
i+ 1
rank of qi in [q′0, . . . , q
′
j−1] + 1
,
where the rank of qi is zero in case it does is not
contained in the list [q′0, . . . , q
′
j−1] otherwise it is i
′,
s.t. qi = q
′
i′ .
Our last metric called NDCGmeasures how the rel-
evant substitutions are placed in the ranking list. It
does not only compare the ranks of a substitution in
the two rankings, but is also penalizes highly relevant
substitutions according to [q0, . . . , qj−1] that have a
very low rank in [q′0, . . . , q
′
j−1]. Moreover, it takes the
length of the actual lists into consideration. We refer
the reader to the paper by Chakrabarti et al. [7] for
details on NDCG.
The discussed metrics compare rankings for one
query. To compare the utility of our algorithms, we
average over all queries. For coverage we average over
all queries for which the original search log produces
substitutions. For all other metrics that try to cap-
ture the precision of a ranking, we average only over
the queries for which the sanitized search logs pro-
duce substitutions. We generated query substitution
only for the 100,000 most frequent queries of the orig-
inal search log since the substitution algorithm only
works well given enough information about a query.
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Figure 8: Coverage of the query substitutions of the
privacy-preserving histogram for m = 1 and m = 6.
In Figure 7 we vary k and ǫ for m = 1 and
we draw the utility curves for top-j for j = 2 and
j = 5. We observe that varying ǫ and k has hardly
any influence on performance. On all precision mea-
sures, ZEALOUS provides utility comparable to k-
query-anonymity. However, the coverage provided by
ZEALOUS is not good. This is because the compu-
tation of query substitutions relies not only on the
frequent query pairs but also on the count of phrase
pairs which record for two sets of keywords how of-
ten a query containing the first set was followed by
another query containing the second set. Thus a
phrase pair can have a high frequency even though all
query pairs it is contained in have very low frequency.
ZEALOUS filters out these low frequency query pairs
and thus loses many frequent phrase pairs.
As a last experiment, we study the effect of in-
creasing m for query substitutions. Figure 8 plots
the average coverage of the top-2 and top-5 substitu-
tions produced by ZEALOUS for m = 1 and m = 6
for various values of ǫ. It is clear that across the
board larger values of m lead to smaller coverage,
thus confirming our intuition outlined the previous
section.
8 Related Work
Related work on anonymity in search logs [1, 12, 21,
13] is discussed in Section 3.1.
More recently, there has been work on privacy in
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Figure 7: Quality of the query substitutions of the ǫ-probabilistic differential privacy-preserving histogram,
and the k-anonymous histogram for varying parameters ǫ (with m = 1) and k. The quality is measured
by comparing the top-2 and top-5 suggested query substitutions to the ground truth recording the NDCG,
MAP, precision, and recall.
search logs. Korolova et al. [17] proposes the same
basic algorithm that we propose in [10] and review
in Section 4.5 They show (ǫ′, δ′)-indistinguishability
of the algorithm whereas we show (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic
differential privacy of the algorithm which is a strictly
stronger guarantee (see Section 5). One difference is
that our algorithm has two thresholds τ, τ ′ as op-
posed to one and we explain how to set threshold τ
optimally. Korolova et al. [17] set τ = 1 (which is
not the optimal choice in many cases). Our exper-
iments augment and extend the experiments of Ko-
rolova et al. [17]. We illustrate the tradeoff of setting
the number of contributions m for various domains
and statistics including L1-distance and KL diver-
gence which extends [17] greatly. Our application
oriented evaluation considers different applications.
We compare the performance of ZEALOUS to that
of k-query anonymity and observe that the loss in
utility is comparable for anonymity and privacy while
anonymity offers a much weaker guarantee.
9 Beyond Search Logs
While the main focus of this paper are search logs,
our results apply to other scenarios as well. For exam-
5In order to improve utility of the algorithm as stated in
[17], we suggest to first filter out infrequent keywords using
the 2-threshold approach of ZEALOUS and then publish noise
counts of queries consisting of up to 3 frequent keywords and
the clicks of their top ranked documents.
ple, consider a retailer who collects customer transac-
tions. Each transaction consists of a basket of prod-
ucts together with their prices, and a time-stamp. In
this case ZEALOUS can be applied to publish fre-
quently purchased products or sets of products. This
information can also be used in a recommender sys-
tem or in a market basket analysis to decide on the
goods and promotions in a store [11]. Another exam-
ple concerns monitoring the health of patients. Each
time a patient sees a doctor the doctor records the
diseases of the patient and the suggested treatment.
It would be interesting to publish frequent combina-
tions of diseases.
All of our results apply to the more general problem
of publishing frequent items / itemsets / consecutive
itemsets. Existing work on publishing frequent item-
sets often only tries to achieve anonymity or makes
strong assumptions about the background knowledge
of an attacker, see for example some of the references
in the survey by Luo et al. [19].
10 Conclusions
This paper contains a comparative study about
publishing frequent keywords, queries, and clicks
in search logs. We compare the disclosure lim-
itation guarantees and the theoretical and prac-
tical utility of various approaches. Our com-
parison includes earlier work on anonymity and
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(ǫ′, δ′)–indistinguishability and our proposed solution
to achieve (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy in
search logs. In our comparison, we revealed inter-
esting relationships between indistinguishability and
probabilistic differential privacy which might be of
independent interest. Our results (positive as well as
negative) can be applied more generally to the prob-
lem of publishing frequent items or itemsets.
A topic of future work is the development of algo-
rithms to release useful information about infrequent
keywords, queries, and clicks in a search log while
preserving user privacy.
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A Online Appendix
This appendix is available online [10]. We provide it
here for the convenience of the reviewers. It is not
meant to be part of the final paper.
A.1 Analysis of ZEALOUS: Proof of
Theorem 10
Let H be the keyword histogram constructed by
ZEALOUS in Step 2 when applied to S and K be
the set of keywords in H whose count equals τ . Let
Ω be the set of keyword histograms, that do not con-
tain any keyword in K. For notational simplicity,
let us denote ZEALOUS as a function Z. We will
prove the theorem by showing that, given Equations
(4) and (5),
Pr[Z(S) /∈ Ω] ≤ δ, (6)
and for any keyword histogram ω ∈ Ω and for any
neighboring search log S′ of S,
e−ǫ·Pr[Z(S′)=ω] ≤ Pr[Z(S)=ω] ≤ eǫ·Pr[Z(S′)=ω].
(7)
We will first prove that Equation (6) holds. As-
sume that the i-th keyword in K has a count c˜i in
Z(S) for i ∈ [1, |K|]. Then,
Pr[Z(S) /∈ Ω]
= Pr
[
∃i ∈ [1, |K|], c˜i > τ
′
]
= 1− Pr
[
∀i ∈ [1, |K|], c˜i ≤ τ
′
]
= 1−
∏
i∈[1,|K|]
(∫ τ ′−τ
−∞
1
2λ
e−
|x|
λ dx
)
(the noise added to c˜i has to be ≥ τ
′ − τ)
= 1−
(
1−
1
2
· e−
τ′−τ
λ
)|K|
≤
|K|
2
· e−
τ′−τ
λ
≤
U ·m
2τ
· e−
τ′−τ
λ (because |K| ≤ U ·m/τ)
≤
U ·m
2τ
· e−
−λ ln( 2δU·m/τ )
λ (by Equation 5)
= δ. (8)
Next, we will show that Equation (7) also holds.
Let S′ be any neighboring search log of S. Let ω be
any possible output of ZEALOUS given S, such that
ω ∈ Ω. To establish Equation (7), it suffices to prove
that
Pr[Z(S) = ω]
Pr[Z(S′) = ω]
≤ eǫ, and (9)
Pr[Z(S′) = ω]
Pr[Z(S) = ω]
≤ eǫ. (10)
We will derive Equation (9). The proof of (10) is
analogous.
Let H ′ be the keyword histogram constructed by
ZEALOUS in Step 2 when applied to S′. Let ∆ be
the set of keywords that have different counts in H
and H ′. Since S and S′ differ in the search history
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of a single user, and each user contributes at most
m keywords, we have |∆| ≤ 2m. Let ki (i ∈ [1, |∆|])
be the i-th keyword in ∆, and di, d
′
i, and d
∗
i be the
counts of ki in H , H
′, and ω, respectively. Since a
user adds at most one to the count of a keyword (see
Step 2.), we have di − d
′
i = 1 for any i ∈ [1, |∆|].
To simplify notation, let Ei, E
′
i, and Ei
∗, E′i
∗
denote
the event that ki has counts di, d
′
i, d
∗
i in H , H
′, and
Z(S), Z(S′), respectively. Therefore,
Pr[Z(S) = ω]
Pr[Z(S′) = ω]
=
∏
i∈[1,|∆|]
Pr[Ei
∗ | Ei]
Pr[E′i
∗ | E′i]
.
In what follows, we will show that Pr[Ei
∗|Ei]
Pr[E′i
∗|E′i]
≤ e1/λ
for any i ∈ [1, |∆|]. We differentiate three cases: (i)
di ≥ τ , d
∗
i ≥ τ , (ii) di < τ and (iii) di = τ and
d∗i = τ − 1.
Consider case (i) when di and d
∗
i are at least τ .
Then, if d∗i > 0, we have
Pr[Ei
∗ | Ei]
Pr[E′i
∗ | E′i]
=
1
2λe
−|d∗i−di|/λ
1
2λe
−|d∗i−d
′
i|/λ
= e(|d
∗
i−d
′
i|−|d
∗
i−di|)/λ
≤ e|di−d
′
i|/λ
= e
1
λ . (because |di − d
′
i| = 1 for any i)
On the other hand, if d∗i = 0,
Pr[Ei
∗ | Ei]
Pr[E′i
∗ | E′i]
=
∫ τ ′−di
−∞
1
2λe
−|x|/λdx∫ τ ′−d′i
−∞
1
2λe
−|x|/λdx
≤ e
1
λ .
Now consider case (ii) when di is less than τ . Since
ω ∈ Ω, and ZEALOUS eliminates all counts in H
that are smaller than τ , we have d∗i = 0, and Pr[E
∗
i |
Ei] = 1. On the other hand,
Pr[E′i
∗
| E′i] =
{
1, if d′i ≤ τ
1− 12e
−|τ ′−d′i|/λ, otherwise
Therefore,
Pr[Ei
∗ | Ei]
Pr[E′i
∗ | E′i]
≤
1
1− 12e
−|τ ′−d′i|/λ
≤
1
1− 12e
−(τ ′−τ)/λ
≤
1
1− 12e
ln
(
2−2e−
1
λ
) (by Equation 7)
= e
1
λ .
Consider now case (iii) when di = τ and d
∗
i =
τ − 1. Since ω ∈ Ω we have d∗i = 0. Moreover, since
ZEALOUS eliminates all counts inH that are smaller
than τ , it follows that Pr[E∗i | E
′
i] = 1. Therefore,
Pr[Ei
∗ | Ei]
Pr[E′i
∗ | E′i]
= Pr[Ei
∗ | Ei] ≤ e
1
λ .
In summary, Pr[Ei
∗|Ei]
Pr[E′i
∗|E′i]
≤ e1/λ. Since |∆| ≤ 2m,
we have
Pr[Z(S) = ω]
Pr[Z(S′) = ω]
=
∏
i∈[1,|∆|]
Pr[Ei
∗ | Ei]
Pr[E′i
∗ | E′i]
≤
∏
i∈[1,|∆|]
e1/λ
= e|∆|/λ
≤ eǫ (by Equation 6 and |∆| ≤ 2m).
This concludes the proof of the theorem.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Assume that, for all search logs S, we can divide the
output space Ω into to two sets Ω1,Ω2, such that
(1) Pr[A(S) ∈ Ω2] ≤ δ, and
for all search logs S′ differing from S only in the
search history of a single user and for all O ∈ Ω1:
(2) Pr[A(S) = O] ≤ eǫ Pr[A(S′) = O] and
Pr[A(S′) = O] ≤ eǫ Pr[A(S) = O].
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Consider any subset O of the output space Ω of A.
Let O1 = O ∩Ω1 and O2 = O ∩Ω2. We have
Pr[A(S) ∈ O]
=
∫
O∈O2
Pr[A(S) = O]dO +
∫
O∈O1
Pr[A(S) = O]dO
≤
∫
O∈Ω2
Pr[A(S) = O]dO + eǫ
∫
O∈Ω1
Pr[A(S′) = O]dO
≤ δ + eǫ
∫
O∈Ω1
Pr[A(S′) = O]dO
≤ δ + eǫ · Pr[A(S′) ∈ Ω1].
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We have to show that for all search logs S, S′ differing
in one user history and for all sets O :
Pr[Aˆ(S) ∈ O] ≤ Pr[Aˆ(S′) ∈ O] + 1/(|D| − 1).
Since Algorithm Aˆ neglects all but the first input this
is true for neighboring search logs not differing in the
first user’s input. We are left with the case of two
neighboring search logs S, S′ differing in the search
history of the first user. Let us analyze the output
distributions of Algorithm 1 under these two inputs
S and S′. For all search histories except the search
histories of the first user in S, S′ the output proba-
bility is 1/(|D| − 1) for either input. Only for the
two search histories of the first user S1, S
′
1 the out-
put probabilities differ: Algorithm 1 never outputs
S1 given S, but it outputs this search history with
probability 1/(|D| − 1) given S′. Symmetrically, Al-
gorithm Aˆ never outputs S′1 given S
′, but it outputs
this search history with probability 1/(|D|− 1) given
S. Thus, we have for all sets O
Pr[Aˆ(S) ∈ O] =
∑
d∈O∩(D−S1)
1/(|D| − 1) (11)
≤ 1/(|D| − 1) +
∑
d∈O∩(D−S2)
1/(|D| − 1)
(12)
= Pr[Aˆ(S) ∈ O] + 1/(|D| − 1) (13)
22
